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A NOT SO RETRO PROBLEM: EXTENDING STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS TO HOLD INSTITUTIONS RESPOSNBILE FOR CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOUNTABLE UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS
TIMOTHY J. MUYANO*
“I felt a little funny about it . . . . I was 12 years old and he was an old
man.”1
I.

ONE DAY AT A TIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE
UNITED STATES

In 1986, twelve-year-old Patrick McSorley grieved with his schizophrenic,
and now widowed, mother after his father’s recent suicide.2 During this difficult
time, Father John J. Geoghan, a priest from the family’s local Roman Catholic
parish, stopped by the family’s Boston, Massachusetts home to offer his
condolences and take Patrick out for ice cream.3 On the way back, Geoghan
allegedly placed his hand on the boy’s upper leg and slid his hand toward the
child’s genitals.4 The elderly priest, whose history of sexual abuse was well
known by his supervising personnel within the Archdiocese of Boston, soon
began to masturbate the boy and eventually himself.5 Before being dropped off
back at his mother’s house, Geoghan simply told Patrick, “We’re very good at
keeping secrets.”6
Unfortunately, stories like Patrick’s are not uncommon; one report estimates
that 15.2% of women and 6.4% of men have endured sexual abuse as children.7
*
J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.S.
2016, University of New Haven. This Comment is dedicated to my mother, Mary Ellen.
Although I lost you as my law school journey was beginning, thank you for teaching me that it
is not about waiting for the storm to pass, but learning to dance in the rain. I would also like to
thank everyone on Villanova Law Review who guided and supported me throughout the writing
process.
1. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 6,
2002), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/church-allowed-abusepriest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://perma.cc/5VWY-K4G9]
(quoting Patrick McSorely, a man who at only age twelve was allegedly sexually abused by
family priest John J. Geoghan).
2. See id. (discussing the context of Patrick McSorely’s victimization).
3. See id. (discussing Geoghan’s visit to McSorely’s home after learning of father’s
passing and offering to take the boy for ice cream).
4. See id. (detailing the encounter between McSorely and Geoghan).
5. See id. (discussing Geoghan’s history of abuse and Archdiocese of Boston’s
knowledge of Geoghan’s sexual abuse tendencies); see also Evan Richman, Geoghan Preferred
Preying
on
Poorer
Children,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Jan.
7,
2002)
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/07/geoghan-preferred-preyingpoorer-children/69DE1kOuETjphwmIBcgzCM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/45ES-6MF6]
(reporting on Geoghan’s victim preference, his psychological treatment history, frequency of
allegations against him, and the Archdiocese of Boston’s responses to these specific
allegations).
6. Rezendes, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, About Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System ACE Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 1,

(47)
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Despite this documented prevalence, child sexual abuse (CSA) often goes
unreported.8
Individual perpetrators of the CSA bear the brunt of the responsibility for
the unspeakable acts they commit against children.9 However, it is not
uncommon for institutions that supervise, or are otherwise responsible for the
alleged perpetrators to have contributed in some way to these heinous acts
suffered by so many children.10 One of the most notable examples of such an
institution is the Roman Catholic Church.11 The issue gained national attention
in the United States after The Boston Globe Spotlight Team published a now
famous article detailing the abuse of Patrick McSorley and countless other
children, while also exposing the Archdiocese of Boston’s attempt to cover up
CSA committed by priests it directly supervised.12
Unfortunately, incidents like this are not isolated to this Roman Catholic
diocese.13 Similar patterns of institutional mishandling of CSA have been

2016), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/ace_brfss.html [https://perma.cc/
N7JF-W8UP] (summarizing the statistics of a study examining adverse childhood experiences).
8. See Emily M. Douglas & David Finkelhor, Childhood Sexual Abuse Fact Sheet,
AGAINST
CHILD.
RES.
CTR.
(May
2005),
CRIMES
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/factsheet/pdf/childhoodSexualAbuseFactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L9W5-SCY8] (identifying the failure of child sexual abuse to be reported as
a problem for estimating victimization of child sexual abuse); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS
OF CRIME, Child Sexual Abuse Statistics, http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-childsexual-abuse/child-sexual-abuse-statistics [https://perma.cc/M7NX-8RQ7] (last visited Mar. 7,
2018) (discussing child sexual abuse statistics based on a study about child maltreatment
conducted by the United States Department of Health and Human Services).
9. See Richard Fossey & Todd A. Demitchell, “Let the Master Answer”: Holding
Schools Vicariously Liable When Employees Sexually Abuse Children, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 575,
576 (1996) (discussing sexual assault as an illegal act “committed for private gratification and
fall[s] outside the scope of the perpetrator’s employment responsibilities”); see also Jennifer K.
Weinhold, Note, Beyond the Traditional Scope-of-Employment Analysis in the Clergy Sexual
Abuse Context, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 531, 534 (2009) (explaining the concept of direct
liability in the clergy sexual abuse context).
10. See Marci A. Hamilton, Child Sex Abuse in Institutional Settings: What Is Next, 89
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421, 424 (2012) (noting how institutions cover up knowledge of
pedophilia to maintain their image). In the past, institutional-based abuse cases were kept secret
for years and even decades, whereas the significant media attention surrounding situations
involving the Catholic Church, Pennsylvania State University, and the Boy Scouts of America
is a more recent phenomenon. See id. at 423–24 (discussing the recent shift of public attention
on institutional-based child sexual abuse over more common abuse cases that involve family or
friends).
11. See id. at 425–26 (discussing several instances of child sexual abuse committed by
Roman Catholic priests within various dioceses in the United States). See generally Constance
Frisby Fain & Herbert Fain, Sexual Abuse and the Church, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 209
(2006).
12. For a summary and discussion of The Boston Globe article and the role played in the
sexual victimization of children by the Archdiocese of Boston, see supra notes 1–6 and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Snyder v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1326 (1988)
(dismissing an action against Boy Scouts of America for alleged sexual misconduct committed
by a scout leader because of the statute of limitations); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE
LAW OF TORTS § 247 n.9 (2d ed. 2017) (citing case law involving civil child sexual abuse
actions brought against institutions); Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424 (identifying institutions
other than the Catholic Church that have had organizational issues with child sexual abuse).
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exposed in “the Philadelphia Roman Catholic Archdiocese, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, and among rabbis in the Orthodox Jewish and
Hasidim communities.”14 Moreover, the transgressions of administrators at
Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) and Jerry Sandusky, a former football
coach at Penn State, show that CSA problems are not limited to religious
institutions.15
The power to hold these offending institutions accountable in civil court is
critical to addressing institutional CSA.16 However, many victims cannot
understand or process the physical abuse they were subject to as children or
appreciate the importance of filing a civil cause of action in a court of law; in
fact, many fail to recognize this as an option.17 For this reason, many CSA
victims do not come forward until years after the actual abuse had taken place.18
From a civil liability perspective, delayed reporting increases the risk that the
victim may no longer be able to bring a civil suit if the statute of limitations
period—or the time in which a party is legally permitted to file a suit—has
expired within a given state.19 In these instances, state constitutions may prevent
the legislature from passing laws that extend the limitations period and revive a

14. See, e.g., Callahan v. State, 464 N.W.2d 268, 269 (Iowa 1990) (ruling on child abuse
claim in state school over span of several years); Roe v. Gelineau, 794 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I.
2002) (hearing civil claim of alleged abuse in Catholic orphanage); see also DOBBS, supra note
13, § 247 (discussing usual instances of child sexual abuse in non-institutional and institutional
settings); Hamilton, supra note 10, at 425–24 (specifying institutions with a record of internal
issues of child sexual abuse).
15. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424–25 (summarizing the child sexual abuse case
involving Penn State and Jerry Sandusky); see also Susan Candiotti, Disturbing Emails Could
Spell More Trouble for Penn State Officials, CNN (July 2, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2012/06/30/justice/penn-state-emails/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VEW4GVWJ] (detailing actions taken by Penn State administration after gaining knowledge of
alleged child sexual abuse committed by former football coach, Jerry Sandusky).
16. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Who is Responsible for Child Sexual Abuse? A View
from the Penn State Scandal, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 297, 310 (2014) (“[W]hen asking
the civil responsibility question in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should
retain the accountability of third parties.”); cf. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule:
Allowing Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunity for Redress, 61 BROOK.
L. REV. 199, 229–30 (1995) (arguing opportunity to prove sexual abuse occurred when harm
caused by abuse caused repression and failure to bring suit within limitations period is issue of
“fundamental fairness”).
17. See Jenna Miller, Note, The Constitutionality of and Need for Retroactive Civil
Legislation Relating to Child Sexual Abuse, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 599, 603 (2011)
(discussing the tendency of child abuse victims to keep stories of their abuse to themselves).
18. See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (noting child sexual abuse claims are “typically
brought by mature adults, thirty or forty years of age or even older”); see also Miller, supra
note 17, at 603 (discussing the story of a California police officer who was extremely hesitant
to come forward with his personal experience of being sexually abused by a priest as child due
to shame and embarrassment).
19. See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (discussing the effects of repressed memory and
other psychological impediments to bringing suit against perpetrators of child sexual abuse). In
many child sexual abuse cases, “the claim is that the plaintiff’s suffering leads to repression . . .
that causes her to lose all conscious memory of the abuse before she has become an adult.” See
id.; see also Miller, supra note 17, at 605 (discussing the effect of statute of limitations on child
sexual abuse victims who were not psychologically ready to file lawsuit against their abuser as
children).
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CSA suit.20
This Comment analyzes how state constitutions and statutes of limitations
prevent institutions from being held accountable for CSA.21 Specifically, this
Comment draws attention to institutional CSA in America—a pressing issue that
lawmakers and average citizens may not consider when contemplating the issue
of retroactive statutes of limitations.22 This Comment contends that all states
should adopt a constitutional approach that permits retroactive extensions of
statutes of limitations.23 This approach would grant state lawmakers the authority
to retroactively apply extensions to the statute of limitations for civil CSA cases.24
Reviving time-barred sexual abuse claims not only allows state legislatures to
empower victims, but it would also hold institutions liable for abuses that they
contributed to.25
Part II of this Comment discusses statutes of limitation generally, the legal
issues that arise from retroactive extensions of these laws, and the implications
of limitation periods in civil institutional CSA cases.26 Part III provides a detailed
summary of federal and state cases, statutes, and judicial reasoning supporting
the three approaches to evaluating state constitutionality of retroactive statutes.27
Part IV offers a critical analysis of the impact state constitutions and statutes of
limitation have on CSA victims and potentially responsible institutions.28 Part V
concludes the Comment and encourages constituents and lawmakers in states
prohibiting retroactive extensions to consider how this type of public policy may
contribute to or perpetuate the problem of CSA within organizations.29

20. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510 (Conn.
2015) (discussing the impact of state constitutional restrictions on the ability of state legislatures
to revive a time-barred claim through the retroactive extension of statutes of limitations).
21. See id. at 508–14 (discussing the approaches employed by all forty-four U.S. “sister”
states, which have decided the issue of retroactive revival of time-barred claims as of 2015).
22. For a discussion of civil claims for child sexual abuse against supervising institutions,
see infra note 51–57 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of why all states should adopt retroactive statutes of limitations, see
infra notes 145–61 and accompanying text. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 629 (1885)
(establishing federal approach to evaluating constitutionality of revival of previously
time-barred claims through retroactive extension of statutes of limitation); see also Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (confirming approach established in Campbell
in modern day securities litigation context).
24. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (discussing impact of Campbell and
Chase Securities on legislative authority).
25. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 302–07 (discussing importance of preserving
institutional accountability in child sexual abuse cases).
26. For a further discussion of retroactively extended statutes of limitation as applied to
civil institutional child sexual abuse claims, see infra notes 40–50 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of the cases, statutes, and constitutional provisions that make
up each approach to retroactivity and the statute of limitations, see infra notes 75–144 and
accompanying text.
28. For a critical analysis of the various approaches used by states in determining state
constitutionality of retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations, see infra notes 145–61 and
accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the impact of the various approaches used by states, see infra
notes 162–72 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/3

4

Muyano: A Not so Retro Problem: Extending Statutes of Limitations to Hold

2018]

A NOT SO RETRO PROBLEM
II.

51

BACKGROUND: CAN TIME REALLY HEAL ALL WOUNDS?

Simply put, a CSA victim may be prevented from holding responsible parties
accountable because their actions may not have been filed within the state’s
statute of limitations period.30 However, in an attempt to allow alleged victims
to have their day in court, some state legislatures have amended their laws so that
the statute of limitations may be retroactively extended in several contexts,
including CSA.31 This type of retroactive legislation revives expired civil CSA
claims that were not timely filed within the statute of limitations, giving victims
another opportunity to file a legal action.32
A. Beat the Clock: The Statute of Limitations
Generally, the term statute of limitations refers to a “time frame set by
legislation where affected parties need to take action to enforce rights or seek
30. See Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (explaining the application of statutes of limitation
to child sexual abuse claims).
31. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn.
2015) (discussing legislative approaches to reviving time-barred claims by retroactively
extending the statute of limitations period in some causes of action). In Hartford Roman
Catholic, the Supreme Court of Connecticut evaluated the validity of an extension of the sexual
abuse statute of limitations, which retroactively revived a plaintiff’s otherwise time-barred
claim under the Connecticut constitution. See id. at 494–95 (identifying a defendant’s state
constitutional challenge to the extension of statute of limitations in Connecticut). The plaintiff,
who brought the civil action, had been sexually abused as a child by a Roman Catholic priest
supervised by the defendant, the Archdiocese of Hartford, a Roman Catholic Diocese. See id.
at 470. At the trial level, a jury found the Archdiocese had proximately caused the plaintiff’s
injuries through negligent and reckless conduct, specifically in its (1) supervision of the abusive
priest, (2) failure to eject the priest once it became aware of the abuse, and (3) failure to warn
others of the threat that the priest presented to others. See id. at 476 (summarizing the trial
court’s findings and judgment against the defendant). However, on appeal, the diocese argued
that the statute of limitations for sexual abuse in Connecticut had time-barred the plaintiff’s
cause of action and that the retroactive application of the statute violated the diocese’s
substantive due process rights under the Connecticut constitution. See id. The Archdiocese
argued that, as a matter of substantive due process, the Connecticut state constitution, unlike
the United States Constitution, prohibits the type of retroactive extension of the statute of
limitations. See id. at 495. Connecticut courts use six factors when evaluating the validity of
this type of legislation under the Connecticut constitution. See id. at 497 (explaining that
Geisler established the framework to determine if the Connecticut constitution affords greater
protection than the United States Constitution). Because one of these factors requires weighing
the persuasive precedents of other state courts, the Supreme Court of Connecticut in Hartford
Roman Catholic engaged in a comprehensive survey of the approaches used by all those states
that have made state constitutional rulings on retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations as
a general matter. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508–09 (discussing the method of
determining various state approaches). In its rigorous analysis, the Supreme Court of
Connecticut grouped together states that have ruled on this issue into three large categories and
specifically referenced the leading case that supports the approach currently used by each state.
See id. at 509–13. The Supreme Court of Connecticut specifically categorized the state
approaches into three groups: (1) those that follow the federal approach in Campbell and Chase
Securities, (2) those that hold that amending a statute of limitations to revive a time-lapsed claim
is per se invalid, and (3) those that fall between the other two broad approaches. See id.
32. See Miller, supra note 18, at 600 (discussing the concept of revival of otherwise
time-barred claims through retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations as applied
specifically to civil child sexual abuse claims).
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redress after injury or damage.”33 After this time period has expired, rights, such
as the ability to recover civil damages, can no longer be enforced by a legal action
or lawsuit.34 These types of statutes exist primarily to provide fairness to
defendants.35 At some point, a cause of action becomes so “ancient” that a party
cannot reasonably expect to be obligated to legally answer for its past actions.36
There are a variety of valid reasons why these ancient causes of action are
not fit to be brought before a court and are time-barred by legislators.37 Over
time, evidence may not be properly preserved and witnesses, if they can even be
found, may have forgotten essential facts.38 The statute of limitations reflects a
public policy that it is unfair to assign blame to a party based on evidence that
has been significantly devalued over time.39
B. Tick Tock: Child Sexual Abuse, Statute of Limitations, and
Retroactivity
In the civil context, a law is “retroactive” if it applies to conduct even if it
was enacted after that conduct occurred.40 A retroactive law can take precedent
33. See Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018)
(defining the term “statute of limitations”).
34. See Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (identifying the consequences associated with
expiration of statutes of limitations). The lapse of the statute of limitations period essentially
ends the game for a potential plaintiff as would the game clock in an athletic event after it hits
zero and signals that the contest is over. See id.
35. See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950) (explaining the primary goal of statutes of limitations). Federal courts have also
recognized the importance of statutes of limitations in providing fairness to defendants. See id.
at 1185. For a discussion of the statute of limitations as applied by the Supreme Court, see infra
notes 79–112.
36. See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, supra note 35, at 1185
(discussing a defendant’s reasonable expectation not to answer to legal obligations after a
prolonged time period); see also The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897) (“The
foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to be looked for in the position of the
person who gains them, not in that of the loser.”).
37. See, e.g., Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1994)
(identifying reasons supporting statute of limitations legislation); see also James R. MacAyeal,
The Discovery Rule and The Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of
Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 589, 590–92 (1996)
(identifying four purposes of statutes of limitations as (1) encouraging prompt filing of claims,
(2) protecting defendants from fraudulent claims, (3) providing defendant with assurance that
liability will not be attached for conduct from long ago, and (4) promoting efficient judicial
administration).
38. See Order of R.R. Tels., 321 U.S. at 349 (explaining the purposes served by statutes
of limitations). In discussing the theory in favor of the statute of limitations even when a
genuine and justified claim may exist, the Order of Railroad Telegraphers court noted “it is
unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” See
id. at 349; see also MacAyeal, supra note 37, at 590–92 (discussing fundamental purposes of
statutes of limitation in promoting public policy and judicial administration).
39. See Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations, supra note 35, at 1185–86
(discussing public policy considerations supporting statutes of limitations, including outdated
evidence and effectiveness of courts).
40. See Miller, supra note 17, at 600; see also Retroactive Statute, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018) (“[A retroactive statute is] a law that imposes a new
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over another law that may have previously applied to the conduct.41 For instance,
consider Defendant A wronged Plaintiff A in 2010, and the 2010 statute of
limitations for Plaintiff A’s cause of action was four years.42 Plaintiff A did not
file suit by the time the statutory period ran out in 2014.43 However, in 2015, the
legislature amended the law to a six-year statute of limitations, to be applied
retroactively.44 This would mean that, although Plaintiff A missed the statute of
limitations under the 2010 law, a suit could be filed under the new 2015 law.45
While reviving a valid time-barred claim may seem appealing, the process
of enacting retroactive extensions can raise many legal questions.46 Even in the
noble context of addressing CSA, retroactive legislation in some states might
infringe on a defendant’s vested constitutional right.47 In theory defendants
acquire a vested right to be free from answering certain legal obligations when
the defined time period for bringing a suit has lapsed under the statute of
limitations.48 Retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations effectively strip
defendants of such protections under the same statutory authority providing
shelter from time-barred suits in the first place.49 For defendants who rely on the
obligation on past things or a law that starts from a date in the past.”).
41. See Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
81, 82 (1997) (discussing creation of new legal obligations by way of retroactive legislation that
did not exist under a previous legislative scheme).
42. Cf. id. at 87 (identifying impact of retroactive legislation and stating “[a]ction that
was legally permissible at the time it occurred, is either made impermissible, or is burdened, in
the past (i.e., prior to the applicable date of the new law)”).
43. Cf. id.
44. Cf. id.
45. Cf. id.
46. See id. at 82 (discussing the legal ramifications of retroactive legislation in general
and proposing a temporal classification scheme for this type of legislation). Retroactive
legislation inherently involves legal relationships or decisions that relied on prior law that has
since changed or been amended. See id. (discussing a party’s reliance on a previously enacted
law). Because of the reliance on the previous state of a given law, retroactive legislation may
affect pre-existing legal arrangements, impact rights of parties that have been previously
established, and impose unanticipated consequences. See id. (identifying specific areas that
may be affected by retroactive legislation).
47. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510–11 (Conn.
2015) (noting states where retroactive statutes of limitations are a violation of a defendant’s
vested rights); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 15.9(a)(v) (2017) (discussing the importance of classification as a remedy or right for
Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis); Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, 35
YALE L.J. 478, 480 (1926) (discussing the impact of the Campbell decision on modern
jurisprudence). But see Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (discussing argument claiming that statute
of limitations time lapse is vested right that a party is entitled to). For a detailed discussion and
analysis of the various state approaches to evaluating retroactive statutes of limitations, see infra
notes 113–44 and accompanying text.
48. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (noting states where defendant has a
vested right in time-barred causes of action); see also Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (noting that,
in some instances, retroactive legislation may infringe on a vested right that arose under
previously enacted law). When legislatures prohibit retroactive statutes of limitations because
this action would infringe on vested rights, the retroactive legislation is considered invalid per
se. See Per Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d online ed. 2018) (defining term “per se” as “in
itself; taken alone; inherently; in isolation; unconnected with other matters”).
49. See Miller, supra note 17, at 601 (“[A]busers would be deprived of reliance on the
statute of limitations to protect them from liability.”); see also Laitos, supra note 41, at 91
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protections of statutes of limitations, retroactive legislation can create a new
burdensome obligation, impose a new duty, or attach new liability to events or
considerations that have already taken place.50
C. Institutional Accountability: You Do the Crime, You Do the Time
CSA victims can sue both the perpetrator who physically committed the
abuse and, under certain circumstances, the institution that supervised the
abuser.51 Depending on the forum state or jurisdiction, potential tort claims that
may be brought against churches and other negligent institutions include, but are
not limited to, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, negligent
retention, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.52 Such suits not
only empower the victim, but can also have a deterrent effect on the institution’s
enabling behavior.53
The possibility of being held liable in a court of law encourages institutions
to take measures to ensure that they protect the youth they are responsible for.54
(identifying valid and invalid types of retroactive legislation). The classic example of
retroactivity is when a legislature adopts a rule that changes the legal implications on a party
and implications that were already established under prior valid legislation. See id. The typical
timeline for such an event can be summarized into four stages:
(1) The legislative body adopts a substantive rule (the “old law”).
(2) After its adoption, private conduct occurs consistent with, or perhaps because of,
this old law.
(3) The legislative body adopts a new substantive rule (the “new law”).
(4) After its adoption, the new law in some way affects the legal consequences of the
private conduct that occurred under the old law.
Id. at 92.
50. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 269 n.24 (1994) (providing
examples of burdens of retroactive legislation, such as a new zoning law changing the
expectations of a developer or an anti-gambling law passed after plans for a casino were
approved); see also Miller, supra note 17, at 600 (discussing the Landgraf approach to
retroactivity).
51. See, e.g., Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ill. 2009) (identifying civil
claims brought against a diocese who supervised sexually abusive priest); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST . 2006) (defining and
discussing theory of respondeat superior); Weinhold, supra note 9, at 534–37 (comparing direct
liability against individual perpetrators of sexual abuse and vicarious liability against agencies
responsible for abusers through respondeat superior). “Respondeat superior is the specific
theory of vicarious liability under which an employer is held responsible for the legal
consequences of an employee’s intentional tort against a third party.” Id. at 536.
52. See, e.g., Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E. 2d at 475 (identifying tort claims brought
against the Diocese of Dallas, including negligent supervision and negligent retention).
53. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 307 (arguing that imposing gatekeeper type liability
on institutions serves a deterrent function). This deterrent effect, specifically with respect to
putting the public on notice of wrongdoing, has been used to deter individual sex offenders.
See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of Criminal Registries and the Illusion of
Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 518 (2013) (discussing the legislative intent of sexual abuse laws
as deterrence to potential offenders and discouragement of previous offenders from repeating
illegal actions).
54. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 297–98, 307 (discussing the role courts and
legislatures play in deterring child abuse); see also Frank A. Sloan et. al, Liability, Risk
Perceptions, and Precautions at Bars, 43 J.L. & ECON. 473, 497–98 (2000) (noting tort liability
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This argument is supported by the fact that institutions like the Catholic Church
place significant value on maintaining a positive institutional image and
reputation.55 Before the Boston Globe story was published in 2002, the media
commonly cooperated in keeping CSA stories involving the church off the front
page for the very reason of preserving its reputation, while institutional leaders
went to great lengths to maintain a “pristine” image.56 Retroactively expanding
CSA statutes of limitations may not generate new media coverage of the issue,
but it may deter and prevent further institutional CSA.57
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RETROACTIVE EXTENSIONS OF STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS
The federal constitutional concerns associated with retroactive extensions of
statutes of limitations are rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment.58 The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from taking
life, liberty, or property of its citizens without due process of law.59 The
Fourteenth Amendment is relevant in the context of statutes of limitations
because the Due Process Clause protects the vested property rights of a defendant,
which, some have argued, includes the right to rely on the expired limitations
as a deterrent has not been researched thoroughly but arguing “theoretical analyses of tort as a
deterrent are quite optimistic about its effects”).
55. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 424 (discussing taboos associated with talking about
the Catholic Church and child sexual abuse).
56. See id. (discussing the role of the media in preserving institutional reputation through
the lack of adequate coverage of institutional child sexual abuse).
57. See id. at 439 (“Now, with the public becoming more well-informed and the horrible
facts [of child sex abuse] on the front pages, there is a real possibility that the legal system can
be reformed to protect children and deter institutions that protect abusers.” (emphasis added));
see also Patrick M. Garry, The Rising Role of State Constitutional Law: An Introduction to a
Series of Articles on the South Dakota Constitution, 59 S.D. L. REV. 4, 7 (2014) (discussing
how state constitutions “set up the basic organization of government, outline various
government duties, and specify and protect individual rights”).
58. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (holding the revival of debt claim
previously time-barred by statute of limitations is constitutionally permissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment). Although the holding in Campbell may seem dated, the Court again
visited the issue of reviving time-barred claims in Chase Securities. See Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315 (1945) (“The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of
state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation.”). Despite the time
that had lapsed between these two decisions, the Court still grounded its holding in its
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 315–16 (“[I]t cannot be said that lifting
the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per
se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (establishing constitutional due process rights for
American citizens). Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Id. (emphasis added).
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period to dismiss a civil suit.60
However, the scope of Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protection, as
defined by the courts, has long excluded lapsed statute of limitations periods.61
This lapse of time is merely considered a remedy for a defendant, as opposed to
a property right.62 As a result, enacting legislation that revives a claim otherwise
time-barred by the statute of limitations does not offend a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights and is therefore permissible under the federal
constitution.63
Despite the constitutionality of retroactive extensions of statutes of
limitations at the federal level, states are currently divided on whether these
extensions violate their state constitutions.64 Although some states embrace the
federal approach, others substantially deviate from that type of constitutional
interpretation.65
There are currently three approaches states use to evaluate the
constitutionality of this issue: (1) the federal approach, (2) the per se invalid
approach, and (3) the mixed approach, which falls between the other two
dichotomized positions.66 The common effect each approach has on retroactive
extensions of the statute of limitations is significant.67 States following the
federal approach allow retroactive extensions under their state constitution.68
60. See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 511 (Conn.
2015) (noting states where defendant has a vested right in time-barred causes of action); Ryan
C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 423
(2010) (explaining that vested rights is a natural law concept that endows persons with certain
inalienable rights that a legislature cannot rescind).
61. For a discussion of the Campbell and Chase Securities decisions and impact of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 79–112 and accompanying text.
62. See Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628–29 (distinguishing between vested property rights
protected by Fourteenth Amendment and remedies that fall outside the scope of protections).
63. See id. (holding that defendants hold no property right in statutes of limitations and,
as a result, retroactive legislation does not infringe on any Fourteenth Amendment rights).
64. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508–13 (discussing varying state views
in assessing the constitutionality of reviving claims previously time-barred by the statute of
limitations).
65. See id. (discussing the state approaches that deviate from federal approach outlined
in Campbell and Chase Securities).
66. See id. (noting the three state approaches to the constitutionality of retroactive
statutes of limitations). For a further discussion about the three categories of approaches to state
constitutionality of retroactive extensions to statutes of limitations generally, see supra note 31
and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of the effect that these differing state approaches have, see infra
note 75–144 and accompanying text.
68. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (identifying “sister states” that adopt
the federal constitutional approach of applying retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations
generally). Eighteen states follow the federal approach as established in Campbell and Chase
Securities. See id. Those states include Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawai‘i,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. Generally, the
federal approach used by these states allows “the retroactive expansion of the statute of
limitations to revive otherwise time-lapsed claims—seemingly without limitation.” See id.
Although the Supreme Court of Connecticut identified eighteen states that use the federal
approach, after the ruling in Hartford Roman Catholic, it is clear that Connecticut also evaluates
a defendant’s substantive due process rights, which is consistent with Campbell and Chase
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Conversely, states that use the per se invalid method prohibit this type of statute.69
Avoiding a sweeping “yes” or “no” answer to this question, the remaining states
that use the mixed approach evaluate the state constitutionality within the specific
context that the legislation was passed.70 The approach that states adopt depends
on whether the state constitution considers the lapse of a limitations period a
vested substantive right or a mere remedy.71
Whether a retroactive state statute of limitations is constitutional under a
state’s constitution depends on how much weight a defendant’s interest carries in
seeing the statute of limitations lapse.72 States that apply the per se invalid
approach and preclude retroactive extensions absolve alleged institutional
defendants, such as the Catholic Church, Penn State, or the Boy Scouts of
America, from civil liability after the statute of limitations has run.73 In these
situations, state constitutions shield institutions that had a hand in devastating
many young lives.74
IV. APPROACHES TO STATE CONSTITUTIONALITY: CAN WE RESET THE CLOCK?
Prior to 2015, courts in forty-four states ruled on whether retroactive
extensions of a statute of limitations that revive a time-barred action violated
substantive due process rights under a state constitution.75
However,
Connecticut’s 2015 decision in Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp.76 raised this total to forty-five states.77 There is much variation among
Securities. See id. at 517–18 (holding “retroactive application . . . which revived the plaintiff’s
otherwise time barred claims, did not violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights
under the Connecticut constitution”).
69. See id. at 510–11 (identifying states that absolutely bar revival of time-barred
claims). Twenty-four states use the per se invalid approach for a variety of reasons. See id.
Those states include Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana,
Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
and Virginia. See id. at 510–11 (identifying states that hold the revival of time-barred claims
through retroactive statutes of limitations as per se invalid).
70. See id. at 512–13 (discussing approaches used by New York and Wisconsin when
assessing constitutionality of retroactive extensions to statutes of limitation generally).
71. See id. at 509–12 (illustrating state constitutional due process approaches to statutes
of limitations can be divided into three groups: federal approach, per se invalid approach, and
the mixed approach).
72. See, e.g., Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I. 1996) (stating “state
appellate courts, however, are free to interpret and to construe their own state constitutional due
process and equal protection provisions”).
73. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511–13 (discussing the legal impact of
barring revival of time-lapsed claims under state constitutions).
74. See Miller, supra note 17, at 617 (arguing constitutional authority to enact retroactive
child sexual abuse laws would allow “more child sexual abuse victims . . . to obtain the benefits
these laws provide”).
75. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 508 (noting that forty-four states have
previously ruled on the issue of whether the revival of already time-barred claims violates
substantive due process). For a detailed discussion of state precedent discussing these holdings
and reasoning, see infra notes 113–44 and accompanying text.
76. 119 A.3d 462 (Conn. 2015).
77. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 517–18 (holding that the legislature’s
enactment of retroactive legislation reviving sexual abuse claims passed rational basis review
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these holdings, and even the states that reach the same general conclusion about
statutes of limitation cite a diverse array of authority to support the holding in
each state’s leading case.78
A. The Federal Approach Under Campbell and Chase Securities: All We Got
Is Time
The decisions in Campbell v. Holt79 and Chase Securities Corp. v.
Donaldson80 signify that retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations are
permissible under the United States Constitution “seemingly without
limitation.”81 Notably, Campbell establishes the threshold determination of
whether the statute in question affects a remedy or a right.82 Although these two
seminal cases were not decided in the context of CSA, the rule established by
Campbell and later confirmed by Chase Securities, has significant implications
on statutes of limitations as a general proposition.83 When considering retroactive
extensions of statutes of limitations under the United States Constitution in any
context, Campbell establishes that these types of statutes “go to matters of
remedy, [and] not to destruction of fundamental rights.”84
1.

Campbell v. Holt: Please Reset the Game Clock

In 1885, the Supreme Court established the long-standing rule that statutes
reviving causes of action previously barred by a statute of limitations only
extinguish the remedy associated with the claim, not a vested right.85 In
Campbell, the plaintiff, Malvina Stamps, sued to recover a cash debt owed to
her.86 Although her original cause of action would have expired in 1859, the
Texas legislature, in response to the Civil War, suspended all statutes of
limitations.87 In 1866, the legislature passed a law that commenced all statutes
of limitation.88 Thus, Stamps had until 1868 to file suit against the defendants.89

and did not violate diocese’s substantive due process rights).
78. See id. at 509–13 (discussing the constitutional or statutory authority, or lack thereof,
relied on by forty-four states that have ruled on the revival of claims previously time-barred by
the statute of limitations).
79. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
80. 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
81. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (emphasis added).
82. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (discussing the importance of
classifying whether the statute affects a remedy or right for Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis).
83. See id. (discussing the holding of Chase Securities and remedies under statutes of
limitations).
84. See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (emphasis added).
85. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (holding lapse of statute of
limitations period provides party with remedy and not substantive right under the United States
Constitution).
86. See id. at 620 (describing the facts of the case).
87. See id. at 621.
88. See id.
89. See id. (noting that in 1866, “the statute . . . began to run against her in this case, and
would become a bar in two years”).
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However, she failed to file suit within that time frame, and her claim was barred.90
In 1869, however, the Texas legislature revised the state’s constitution,
which contained a new provision stating that all prior suspensions were still in
effect until the new constitution was ratified.91 This announcement essentially
nullified the 1866 legislation commencing the two-year statute of limitations, and
the statutes of limitations for Stamps’s cause of action remained suspended.92
Stamps then timely filed suit in 1874, within the two years since the Texas
legislature officially adopted the new constitution.93
The defendants, in an attempt to get out of their debt payment, argued that
this state constitutional provision was void because it deprived them of a vested
property right protected by the United States Constitution in the form of the
time-bar created by the statute of limitations.94 Holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover the debt, the Court reasoned that providing a new remedy after
the time-bar had taken effect under the statute did not create a new right for a
plaintiff or impose a new duty to defend on the defendant.95 Moreover, because
the Fourteenth Amendment only protects substantive rights and not remedies, the
statute of limitations period falls outside the scope of due process protections.96
As a result, the revival of a time-barred claim is constitutionally permissible at
the federal level.97
By distinguishing between substantive and remedial statutes, the Campbell
Court clarified that substantive rights are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, while remedies are not.98 As a mere remedy, a defendant has no
vested property right to a statute of limitations defense.99 Remedies are not
“immune from legislative controls” under the Constitution, and “no one
reasonably can expect” them to be.100 Therefore, legislative revival of a claim
90. See id.
91. See id. (the provision stated, “[t]he statutes of limitations of civil suits were
suspended by the so-called act of secession . . . and shall be considered as suspended within this
state until the acceptance of this constitution by the United States congress” (internal quotations
omitted)).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 620.
94. See id. at 622 (discussing the lapse of limitations period as a defense to recovery of
the debt lawsuit).
95. See id. at 628 (“The authorities we have cited, especially in this court, show that no
right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been lost.”).
96. See id. at 628–29 (distinguishing between remedies and substantive rights and
clarifying that only substantive rights enjoy due process protections promised by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480
(discussing the impact of Campbell on modern jurisprudence).
97. See Campbell, 115 U.S. at 628 (“It violates no right of [the defendant’s] . . . when
the legislature says time shall be no bar, though such was the law when the contract was made.”).
98. See Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480 (discussing
the difference between substantive and remedial rights and clarifying the Campbell decision
provided as to this issue). However, the distinction between classifications of right and remedy
is not easily defined. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (“The distinction
between a right and a remedy, at times, can become hazy.”).
99. See Campbell v. Holt—A Rule or an Exception?, supra note 47, at 480–81 (noting if
the statute of limitations only destroys the defendant’s remedy, the plaintiff’s right to sue
remains intact).
100. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v).
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that was time-barred by a previous statute is not a violation of the substantive due
process rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.101
2.

Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson: Back to the Future

Expanding past the context of debt, the Supreme Court in Chase Securities
once again found that a retroactive amendment to a statute of limitations did not
violate a defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.102 In
Chase Securities, a plaintiff brought a civil securities action against a defendant
under the Minnesota Blue Sky Law.103 Agreeing with the defendant’s argument,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations under the Blue
Sky Law had run.104 However, during the time the plaintiff was appealing this
decision, the Minnesota legislature lifted the statute of limitations bar for several
categories of Blue Sky Law cases, including the type of claim brought against the
defendant.105 After learning of this legislative change, the plaintiff re-asserted
his original claim.106
In response, the defendant raised a constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s
retroactive amendment to the Blue Sky Law’s statute of limitations.107 Before
the Supreme Court of the United States, the defendant claimed that the retroactive

101. See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 247 (discussing the federal constitutional implications
of the Campbell Court’s holding that statutes of limitations create remedies that fall outside the
scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections). With respect to amended statutes of limitations
that revive otherwise time lapsed claims, “federal case law supports the constitutionality of such
an application as a general matter of federal due process.” See id.
102. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314–16 (1945) (noting Court’s
agreement with Campbell).
103. See id. at 305–06 (identifying the plaintiff’s cause of action). This suit was brought
under Minnesota’s Blue Sky Law—the state’s securities law—in the context of a securities
litigation that alleged failure to register business units, illegal sales, as well as common-law
fraud and deceit. See id. at 306.
104. See id. at 308–09 (discussing the procedural history of the case); see also ROTUNDA
& NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (summarizing the Chase Securities case).
105. See Chase Sec., 325 U.S. at 307–08 (identifying the timeline of the plaintiff’s
allegations and Minnesota’s amendment to the statute of limitations for specific securities
litigation claims). The previous statute of limitations in Minnesota for fraud did not begin
running until the fraud was discovered. See id. at 307 (identifying the state of the previous law
in Minnesota). However, the new statute of limitations had the following implications on the
parties in Chase Securities:
Under the new law, actions for failure to disclose non-registration or for
misrepresentations concerning registration . . . must be brought within six years of
delivery of the securities. Aggrieved purchasers were therefore denied future benefit
of suspension of the period of limitation during the time such frauds or grounds of
action remained undiscovered . . . . The effect of this was to abolish any defense that
appellant might otherwise have made under the Minnesota statutes of limitation.
Id. at 307–08. (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 308 (discussing the procedural history of the plaintiff’s securities claim);
see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v) (discussing the facts of Chase
Securities).
107. See Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 308 (describing defendant’s constitutional
challenge to the retroactive statute of limitations).
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legislation was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to
invoke the statute of limitations as a defense.108 Disagreeing with the defendant’s
position, the Court held that retroactively extending the statute of limitations for
the Minnesota Blue Sky Law was permissible under the United States
Constitution and consistent with the Court’s holding in Campbell.109 Echoing its
decision in Campbell, the Court reasoned that the statute of limitations merely
created a remedy for a defendant, not a right, and therefore the statutory bar to
suit fell outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
protections.110 By holding that there is no fundamental right to raising the defense
of the statute of limitations, the Court noted that the federal constitution does not
immunize the defendant from suit just because the legislature’s policy change is
disadvantageous.111 The Court noted that, because “[t]he statute of limitations
was a legislative creation . . . the legislature could remove the statute to allow
plaintiffs to pursue their remedy.”112
3.

Keep an Eye on the Clock: The Federal Approach Among the States

Currently, eighteen states stand with the federal government’s approach to
the constitutional interpretation of retroactive extensions of the statute of
limitations.113 Fourteen of these states view the defense of the statute of
limitations through the lens of their state constitutions.114 These states have
interpreted their respective state constitutions to grant no vested right to a statute
of limitations defense.115 In this situation, a party’s substantive due process rights
108. See id. at 305 (discussing the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Minnesota
legislature retroactively reviving the securities claim after the limitations period had expired).
109. See id. at 315 (“The essential holding in Campbell v. Holt, so far as it applies to this
case, is sound and should not be overruled. The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act
of state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation.”).
110. See id. (discussing the Campbell holding). Relying on Campbell, the Court noted:
The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely
because it has some retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of life,
liberty or property without due process of law . . . . Assuming that statutes of
limitation like other types of legislation could be so manipulated that their retroactive
effects would offend the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar
of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is
per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 315–16.
111. See id. at 316 (“Whatever grievance appellant may have at the change of policy to
its disadvantage, it had acquired no immunity from this suit that has become a federal
constitutional right.”).
112. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 47, § 15.9(a)(v).
113. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn.
2015) (surveying state approaches to evaluating the state constitutionality of the retroactive
expansion of statutes of limitations).
114. See id. at 509 (identifying fourteen states that grounded their approaches on the
issue of statutes of limitations time lapses in the interpretation of state constitutions).
115. See id. (“[F]ourteen states, namely Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Washington, and Wyoming, hold that the retroactive expansion of the statute of limitations to
revive time barred claims is not a violations of a defendant’s substantive due process
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cannot be violated and therefore retroactive extensions of the statute of
limitations are constitutionally permissible.116
However, nuances are still evident—even in states that employ a Campbell
approach rooted in state constitutional interpretation.117 For example, Georgia’s
is the only state constitution that contains a provision that explicitly prohibits
retroactive legislation.118 Despite this constitutional conflict, the Supreme Court
rights . . . .”).
116. See id. (discussing the constitutional rationale for permitting legislation that revives
otherwise time-barred claims in fourteen states). States that have permitted retroactive statutes
of limitations include, but are not limited to, Arizona, California, Delaware, Hawai’i, Idaho,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming. See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Super. Ct., 641 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Ariz. 1982)
(holding that “subsequent extensions” of the statute of limitations does not violate the
constitution); 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1247, 1263 (2001) (noting
the rule established in Campbell and Chase Securities is also the rule followed in California);
Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011) (“As a matter of
constitutional law, statutes of limitation go to matters of remedy not destruction of fundamental
rights . . . . Accordingly, the General Assembly has the power to determine a statute of
limitations and such a determination does not violate [the Delaware constitution due process
clause] if it is reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Roe v. Doe, 581
P.2d 310, 315 (Haw. 1978) (“We are unable . . . to accept the proposition that statutory causes
of action which become barred through the expiration of a statute of limitations can never be
revived by a subsequent legislative extension of that period of limitations.”); Peterson v.
Peterson, 320 P.3d 1244, 1250 (Idaho 2014) (“[S]tatutes of limitation involve matters of
remedy, not destruction of rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hecla Mining
Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Idaho 1985))); Harding v. K.C. Wall
Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958, 968 (Kan. 1992) (“The legislature has the power to revive actions
barred by a statute of limitations if it specifically expresses its intent to do so through retroactive
application of a new law.”); City of Boston v. Keene Corp., 547 N.E.2d 328, 335 (Mass. 1989)
(“[T]he running of the limitations period on such claims does not create a vested right which
cannot constitutionally be taken away by subsequent statutory revival of the barred remedy.”
(citation omitted)); Pryber v. Marriott Corp., 296 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (“The
right to defeat a claim by the interposition of a statute of limitations is a right which may be
removed by the Legislature.” (citations omitted)); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 779
(Mont. 1993) (“Montana follows . . . [the Campbell approach] in regard to due process and the
retroactive application of statutes of limitation.”); Panzino v. Cont’l Can Co., 364 A.2d 1043,
1046 (N.J. 1976) (discussing the implications of the Campbell reasoning within New Jersey);
In re W.M.V., 268 N.W.2d 781, 786 (N.D. 1978) (holding the revival of time-barred causes did
not violate the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution or the North Dakota constitution);
Lane v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 151 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash. 1944) (holding no vested right is
affected in reviving a previously time-barred claim); Vigil v. Tafoya, 600 P.2d 721, 725 (Wyo.
1979) (applying the test established in Chase Securities to evaluate retroactive extensions of
statutes of limitations under the Wyoming Constitution).
117. See, e.g., Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (summarizing the Georgia
supreme court’s reasoning in a leading decision regarding extensions of statutes of limitations).
118. See id. at 509 (citing Canton Textile Mills, Inc. v. Lathem, 317 S.E.2d 189 (Ga.
1984)) (discussing the Georgia supreme court’s holding regarding revival of time-barred
claims). The Georgia constitution expressly prohibits the enacting of retroactive laws. See GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ X (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or laws impairing
the obligation of contract or making irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall
be passed.” (emphasis added)). However, like the United States Supreme Court, the Georgia
supreme court has held that the “statute of limitation[s] is remedial in nature.” See Jaro, Inc. v.
Shields, 181 S.E.2d 110, 111 (Ga. 1971). This remedial classification, despite the prohibition
against retroactive laws, has led the Georgia supreme court to hold “although retroactive,
[statutes of limitations] will be enforced, provided they do not impair the obligation of contracts
or disturb absolutely vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss6/3

16

Muyano: A Not so Retro Problem: Extending Statutes of Limitations to Hold

2018]

A NOT SO RETRO PROBLEM

63

of Georgia held that the statute of limitations defense falls outside the scope of
the retroactive legislation ban because of its classification as a remedy in
Georgia.119 Conversely, three federal approach states—Iowa, West Virginia, and
New Mexico—permit retroactive extensions but do not cite constitutional
authority.120 Instead, these states rely on judicial canons of construction.121
B. Tick Tock: The Impermissible Per Se Approach
Departing from the federal approach, twenty-four states have held that a
retroactive extension to a statute of limitations that revives an otherwise
time-barred claim is per se impermissible, meaning that it is absolutely invalid in
any context.122 Although a large mass of states reject the revival of a claim
already barred by the statute of limitations under their state constitutions, the
reasoning used to support such a blanket rejection varies by state.123 One subcategory of these per se states is those that ground their opinion in constitutional
provisions.124
Seven of the per se states depart from the federal approach because of
specific prohibitions against retroactive legislation in their own state
furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations.” Canton Textile Mills, Inc., 317 S.E.2d at 191–92 (citing Seabord Air Line Ry. v.
Benton, 165 S.E. 593, 596 (Ga. 1932)).
119. For a discussion of the statute of limitations and constitutional prohibition against
retroactive law in Georgia, see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 509 (“Iowa, West Virginia, and New
Mexico, do not squarely ground their decisions in any particular state or federal constitutional
provision.”).
121. See id. (discussing the rationale used by courts of Iowa, West Virginia, and New
Mexico to support the approach to evaluating revival of time-barred claims). The Iowa Supreme
Court stated that statutes of limitation only affect the remedy, finding “[i]t is a statute of repose,
one of presumption of nonexistence, or payment or discharge of the cause of action, and does
not destroy the cause of action.” See Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In agreeing with the Supreme Court of the United States,
New Mexico relied heavily on the Campbell decision “that a right to defeat an action for debt
by a plea of the statute of limitations is not a property right nor a vested right, and may be taken
away at will by the Legislature.” See Orman v. Van Arsdell, 78 P. 48, 48 (N.M. 1904).
Similarly, West Virginia has found that state tort law and the corresponding statutes of
limitations do not require absolute stability. See Pnakovich v. SWCC, 259 S.E.2d 127, 131 (W.
Va. 1979) (noting stability is not necessary because the law “is re-written by the Legislature
every session, [and] is an unsettled area of the law which does not reflect stability nor promote
great reliance [on previous status of statute of limitations].”). The Pnakovich court noted that,
unlike property law, people do not conduct their behavior based on their knowledge of tort law.
See id. The court’s rationale was that a change in the statute of limitations for a tort will not
affect a person’s behavior, and thus no right is infringed upon with retroactive statutes of
limitations for torts. See id.
122. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 510 (identifying twenty-four states that
held that retroactive amendments of the statute of limits are per se invalid); see also supra note
48 for definition of “per se.”
123. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 510 (discussing the statutory and
constitutional support relied on by state courts to absolutely prohibit state legislatures from
enacting retroactive extensions to statutes of limitations).
124. See id. at 510–11 (noting that the decisions of eighteen states to per se invalidate
the retroactive revival of time-barred claims were grounded in interpretation of state
constitutional provisions).
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constitutions.125 Moreover, eleven per se states depart from the federal approach
even further by holding that retroactive extensions of the statute of limitations are
a direct infringement on a vested property right that is created under their state
constitutions.126 In these states, once a claim has time-lapsed, the potential
125. See id. at 510 (discussing the reasoning used by seven states to support the per se
invalid approach to retroactive extensions of statutes of limitations). Alabama, Colorado,
Missouri, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas each have state constitutional
provisions that expressly prohibit retroactive legislations. See id. (discussing the constitutional
prohibition against retroactive legislation as justification for per se impermissibility of revival
of time-barred actions); see also Johnson v. Garlock, Inc., 682 So.2d 25, 28 (Ala. 1996)
(discussing Alabama’s constitutional provision against retroactivity and holding “[o]nce an
action is barred by a statute of limitations . . . rights vest in the limitations defense which cannot
be destroyed by subsequent legislative act because [of the relevant Alabama constitutional
provision]” (quoting Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So.2d 263, 268–70 (Ala.
1981))); Jefferson Cty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. D.A.G., 607 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. 1980)
(“Where a statute of limitations has run and the bar attached, ‘the right to plead it as a defense
is a vested right which cannot be taken away or impaired by subsequent legislation.’” (quoting
Willoughby v. George, 5 Colo. 80, 82 (1879))); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d
338, 341–42 (Mo. 1993) (relying on the Missouri Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive
legislation and stating “once the original statute of limitation expires and bars the plaintiff’s
action, the defendant has acquired a vested right . . . that is substantive in nature” (citing Uber
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 441 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Mo. 1969))); Gould v. Concord Hosp., 493 A.2d
1193, 1196 (N.H. 1985) (holding the amendment to limitations period after the period already
expired impaired the “defendants’ vested right to assert the limitations defense and would thus
operate as an unconstitutional retrospective law”); Wright v. Keiser, 568 P.2d 1262, 1267 (Okla.
1977) (finding legislative revival of an otherwise time-barred claim is an express violation of
the Oklahoma constitution); Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d. 690, 696–97 (Tenn. 1974)
(holding that the Tennessee constitutional prohibition against retroactivity bars extension of
lapse limitations period when parties have the “right to ‘expect’ under the prior law they would
not be sued”); Baker Hughes, Inc. v. Keco R. & D., Inc., 12 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. 1999) (“A statute
extending the limitations period of a claim already barred by limitations violates the Texas
Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws . . . .”).
126. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the reasoning used by
courts in Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia). Eleven states bar retroactive extensions to statutes
of limitations because this statutory time-bar is considered a vested property right under each
state constitution. See id. (discussing the revival of time-lapsed claim in eleven states as
“incursion on a vested property right that amounts to a per se violation of substantive due
process” (citations omitted)); see also Johnson v. Lilly, 823 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Ark. 1992)
(stating disagreement with federal approach and holding “legislature cannot expand a statute of
limitation so as to revive a cause of action already barred” (citations omitted)); Wiley v. Roof,
641 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla. 1994) (“Once an action is barred, a property right to be free from a claim
has accrued.”); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 917 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ill. 2009) (holding “[i]f the
claims were time-barred under the old law, they remained time-barred even after the repose
period was abolished by the legislature” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting M.E.H. v.
L.H., 685 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Ill. 1997))); Henry v. SBA Shipyard, Inc., 24 So.3d 956, 960–61
(La. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing retroactivity, substantive legislative change, and vested rights
under Louisiana constitution); Givens v. Anchor Packing, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Neb.
1991) (stating the departure from vested right approach “tramples upon the vested rights of
others”); Colony Hill Condo. Ass’n v. Colony Co., 320 S.E.2d 273, 276 (N.C. 1984) (discussing
the prejudice to defendant’s due process rights through the revival of a time-barred claim); Kelly
v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I. 1996) (finding legislative revival of an already
time-barred action infringes on defendant’s vested and substantive due process rights); Doe v.
Crooks, 613 S.E.2d 536, 538 (S.C. 2005) (holding retroactive application of statutes of
limitations that revive already barred actions infringes on a defendant’s due process rights under
the South Carolina Constitution (citing Goff v. Mills, 308 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1983))); State of
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defendant enjoys a vested property right and no longer needs to defend against a
particular claim.127 Under this type of constitutional interpretation, unlike the
federal approach, any infringement on that right to be free from suit is considered
a violation of substantive due process and invalid legislation.128
There are several states that hold retroactive extensions of the statute of
limitations to be invalid per se without relying on their state constitutions to
support this position.129 Five states embrace the per se invalid approach but do
not cite any source in their constitution or general statutes that create a protected
vested right.130 In these five states—Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania—the complete prohibition against revival of time barred claims is
Minnesota ex rel. Hove v. Doese, 501 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D. 1993) (“When a right to sue has
expired under the applicable statute of limitations prior to the effective date of a new and longer
statute, the new limitations period cannot revive the expired cause of action.”); Roark v.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Utah 1995) (finding a vested right in defense of the statute of
limitation under the Utah constitution); Starnes v. Cayouette, 419 S.E.2d 669, 674 (Va. 1992)
(finding “substantive as well as vested rights are entitled to due process protection”).
127. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (identifying states that grant
defendants a vested property right in a time-barred claim).
128. Compare id. (finding no substantive right to statute of limitations defense under the
state constitution), with Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885), and Chase Sec. Corp.
v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (establishing that lapsed statute of limitations do not
create a substantive right under the federal constitution).
129. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (noting Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont do not cite state constitutional provisions in leading cases
on the revival of time-barred claims).
130. See id. (identifying states that absolutely prohibit the retroactive revival of claim
time-barred by the statute of limitations without citing source of vested right within a state
constitution or statute). Indiana grounds its approach in a rule of construction rather than a
specific statutory or constitutional provision that addresses the issue of retroactivity. See Green
v. Karol, 344 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Ind. App. 1976) (“The general rule is that the statute of
limitations in force at the time of suit governs . . . . However, it is well-established that if, while
the old statute was in force and before plaintiff’s suit was commenced, plaintiff’s right of action
was barred by that statute, no statute subsequently passed can renew defendant’s liability.”
(citations omitted)).
Several other states use similar rules of construction to reach the same conclusion as
Indiana. See, e.g., Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the similarity in
approaches used by Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Pennsylvania, and Oregon); see also, e.g.,
Johnson v. Gans Furniture Indus., Inc., 114 S.W.3d 850, 854–55 (Ky. 2003) (“[A]n amendment
that extends the period of limitation may be applied to a claim in which the period has
not already run, it may not be applied to revive a claim that has expired without impairing vested
rights.” (citations omitted)); Kiser v. Bartley Min. Co., 397 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Ky. 1965)
(discussing the jurisdictional preference for the applicability of legislative amendment “to
claims that arose before the amendment, where the previously existing limitation had not run
on those claims at the time the amendment became effective” (citation omitted)); Dobson v.
Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me. 1980) (discussing that, although there is a
“constructional preference for prospective application,” “retroactive” statutes of limitations are
not unconstitutional as long as they do not “change the legal consequences of acts or events that
occurred prior to the effective date”); Nichols v. Wilbur, 473 P.2d 1022, 1022–23 (Or. 1970)
(“‘It is clear from the decisions of the courts of this state as well as those of other jurisdictions
that a person has no vested right in the running of a statute of limitations unless it has completely
run and barred the action.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Davis & McMillan v. Indus. Acc.
Comm’n, 246 P. 1046, 1047–48 (Cal. 1926))); Maycock v. Gravely Corp., 508 A.2d 330, 334
(Pa. 1986) (“[A]fter an action has become barred by an existing statute of limitations, no
subsequent legislation will remove the bar or revive the action.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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a rule of construction as opposed to a statutory or constitutional restriction.131
Finally, Vermont’s prohibition on retroactive legislation is rooted in a state
statutory provision, rather than any limitation imposed by the Vermont
constitution.132
C. The Mixed Approach: Is Timing Really Everything?
The constitutional approaches used by New York and Wisconsin fall
between the two extremes of the broad, permissible federal approach and the
strict, absolute bar of the per se invalid rule.133 The New York and Wisconsin
courts operate on a case-by-case basis, ultimately delivering a ruling that may be
consistent with either the federal or per se invalid approach.134 New York’s
“exceptional circumstance” standard and Wisconsin’s rational basis review do
not automatically allow or prohibit retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation
under their respective state constitutions.135
New York’s exceptional circumstance standard allows the state legislature
to revive an otherwise time-barred claim if it reasonably determines the
circumstances surrounding the claim are exceptional.136 Additionally, to qualify
as an exceptional circumstance, the potential plaintiff must demonstrate that a
serious injustice would be suffered if the intent of the state legislature was not
honored.137 Similar to the federal view, the New York statute of limitations does
131. For a discussion of the approaches and case law from Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Oregon, and Pennsylvania, see supra note 130.
132. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (summarizing the reasoning in a
leading Vermont case on revival of time-barred claims); see also Murray v. Luzenac Corp., 830
A.2d 1, 2 (Vt. 2003) (discussing the statutory scheme related to the retroactive amendment to
limitation periods); Capron v. Romeyn, 409 A.2d 565, 566–67 (Vt. 1979) (applying a Vermont
statute, rather than the state’s constitution, to the question of retroactive amendment to statutes
of limitation).
133. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 512 (discussing the dichotomy between
the federal approach and the per se invalid approach compared to the more flexible approaches
used by New York and Wisconsin).
134. See id. (summarizing the approaches used by New York and Wisconsin). For a
detailed discussion of the New York and Wisconsin approaches, see infra notes 136–44 and
accompanying text.
135. See Hartford Roman Catholic, 119 A.3d at 511 (discussing the legislative impact
of the New York and Wisconsin approaches on retroactive amendments to statutes of limitations
within each state).
136. See Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 1950) (discussing the
“exceptional circumstances” standard). The Court of Appeals of New York has reasoned:
[T]he Legislature may constitutionally revive a personal cause of action where the
circumstances are exceptional and are such as to satisfy the court that serious
injustice would result to plaintiffs not guilty of any fault if the intention of the
Legislature were not effectuated. This is no inclusive and categorical rule such as
that expressed in Campbell v. Holt . . . , which many State courts have been unwilling
to accept. The tests . . . leave the court free to approach each revival statute on its
individual merits, is the light of its own peculiar circumstances and setting.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 144 N.E. 579, 580–
81 (N.Y. 1924)).
137. See id. at 624 (evaluating constitutionality of retroactive statutes of limitation by
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not create a vested property right for a defendant but instead merely bars a remedy
for a given claim so long as the statute is effective.138 However, the statute of
limitations does not destroy the legislature’s right to change its view on the policy
that was responsible for imposing the questioned time-bar in the first place.139 As
a result, retroactive extensions are not barred under the New York Constitution
per se but may be held unconstitutional when evaluating notions of serious
injustice under the exceptional circumstance standard.140
Unlike defendants in New York courts, Wisconsin defendants do possess a
vested constitutional right when a statute of limitations has lapsed.141 Despite the
classification as a vested right, a revival of a time-barred claim may still be
permissible under the Wisconsin constitution if the revival passes a rational basis
review.142 As a result, the vested right created by the statute of limitations is not
absolute in Wisconsin and must be balanced against the state’s legitimate interest
in addressing a given issue.143 When applying rational basis review to retroactive
statutes of limitation, Wisconsin courts weigh the private interests that will be
damaged by the retroactive aspects of the law and the public interest to be served
by the retroactive extension.144
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TIME TO SYNCHRONIZE OUR WATCHES
The federal constitutional approach to evaluating due process challenges to
retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation provides a workable framework
that should be adopted by all states, especially in the context of institutional
CSA.145 Although individual state constitutions control state civil tort claims,
rather than the U.S. Constitution, the due process analysis established in
Campbell and Chase Securities offers state citizens, legislatures, and courts a
flexible approach without offending the primary purpose of statutes of

determining whether a circumstance is exceptional and would cause a plaintiff serious injustice
if their claim continued to be time-barred).
138. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1885) (finding no vested property
right to statutes of limitation defense under the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomas v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 470 N.E.2d 831, 837 (N.Y. 1984) (“Unlike a judgement, however, the running of
a Statute of Limitations creates no such vested or property right.”).
139. See Thomas, 470 N.E.2d at 837–38 (“[A]though it bars a remedy on the claim so
long as it remains effective, [the statute of limitations] does not destroy the right or foreclose a
change in the legislative policy which resulted in imposition of the bar.” (citations omitted)).
140. See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 623–24 (holding the “exceptional circumstances” test
is the appropriate standard for weighing validity of the revival of time-barred claims under the
New York constitution).
141. See Soc’y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 399–402 (Wis.
2010) (holding the time-bar imposed by the statute of limitations is a substantive right protected
by the Wisconsin constitution).
142. See id. at 401–02 (discussing the balancing test and public interest considerations
served by the retroactive extension of the statute of limitations).
143. See id. at 397 (indicating that a “substantive, or vested, property right is not
dispositive for due process purposes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
144. See id. (identifying the relevant factors for rational basis review).
145. For a discussion of the federal approach rooted in the decisions in Campbell and
Chase Securities, see supra notes 79–112 and accompanying text.
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limitation.146 The federal approach allows young children who have been
sexually victimized to have their day in court, despite the pressing psychological
and emotional barriers that may have prevented them from speaking about their
abuse within the limitations period.147 By allowing legislative changes in policy
in regards to the statute of limitations, the federal approach gives victims an
opportunity to overcome these very real obstacles.148 At the same time, it would
recognize that institutions like the Catholic Church or Penn State cannot find a
vested right to a limitations defense merely because a victim has yet to come
forward.149
In the context of CSA, time should not be interpreted as a vested state
constitutional right that allows an institution to escape liability for its role in the
sexual victimization of children.150 Those states that elevate a time-bar from a
remedy to a constitutionally protected substantive right should be aware of the
very real implications such an interpretation has on sexually abused children.151
Children, and in many cases, adults, who were sexually abused at a young age
but are not ready to retain counsel and file a civil complaint until after
adolescence should not have to face a “buzzer-beater” situation when it comes to
seeking justice.152
Those per se states, which do not permit retroactive extensions of the statute
of limitations because of statutory provisions or judicial rules of construction,
should repeal and replace those binding standards to accommodate victims of
child sexual abuse.153 Such legislative and judicial action would provide victims
146. See Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1994)
(“Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.”).
147. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 429 (noting many victims of child sexual abuse
may “need decades to come forward” or to recognize the “connection between their typically
serious problems in adulthood and the sexual abuse that occurred as a child”).
148. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 US. 620, 628–29 (1885) (finding no vested right to the
statute of limitations time-bar defense under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (finding no unconstitutional infringement on the
vested property right of the defendant through legislative revival of a previously time-barred
claim).
149. See Campbell v. Holt, 115 US. 620, 628–29 (1885); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945); see also Scott Malone & Philip Pullella, The Catholic
Church is Fighting to Block Bills that would Extend the Statute of Limitations for Reporting Sex
Abuse, REUTERS (Sept. 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-as-pope-visit-nears-us-sexvictims-say-church-remains-obstacle-to-justice-2015-9
[https://perma.cc/28A9-DN6T]
(discussing the Roman Catholic Church’s efforts to use “its legal and political clout to oppose
bills that would extend the statute of limitations for victims of child sex abuse”).
150. For a discussion of state constitutional interpretations which categorize a statute of
limitations time lapse as a vested right, see supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text.
151. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 431 (“Legions of victims of child sex abuse have
learned that when they were finally ready to talk to a prosecutor or a lawyer, the . . . statutes of
limitations . . . had already expired. Across the United States, one victim after another has been
surprised by these technical, legal deadlines.”).
152. See id. at 432 (“[M]any states have been working to extend their child sex abuse
SOLs, because there is always a new victim with a compelling story that shows lawmakers the
folly of having any SOL for the crime of child sex abuse.” (emphasis added)).
153. See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 16, at 308 (arguing child victims of sexual abuse
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and society with a judicial platform to increase accountability within institutions
responsible for those heinous acts.154 While remaining as fair as possible to the
defendant, legislatures and courts can limit the application of new legislation to
civil CSA claims without allowing plaintiffs to revive other time-barred
claims.155
Finally, the federal approach authorizes state legislatures to retroactively
expand the statute of limitations for a claim but still accounts for legislative
discretion in any context of a proposed limitations period change.156 Although
there is a risk that all time-barred claims may potentially be revived, every
proposed extension, as with any piece of legislation, will be subject to the
political and legislative process.157 If states are concerned that a reclassification
of the statute of limitations from a right to a remedy presents a slippery slope that
will destroy the statute of limitations defense for claims that are truly antiquated
and not fit for adjudication, the mixed approaches of New York and Wisconsin
offer a reasonable alternative.158
The New York and Wisconsin approaches allow potential defendants to be
treated fairly, given the particular context of the claim and statute, while still
authorizing the legislature to enact laws that will hold institutions with a record
of CSA accountable for their past transgressions.159 Factors such as justice,
accountability, deterrence, and the safety of our nation’s youth are all relevant
and reasonable considerations a state court should be able to weigh against a

should not bear any responsibility for any portion of abuse); Miller, supra note 17, at 600–01
(noting that reviving time-barred claims would allow victims to get retribution against their
attackers). Pennsylvania state representative Mark Rozzi alleges being raped by a priest in a
shower when he was thirteen years old. See Malone & Pullella, supra note 149. Rozzi is now
leading the way in the Penssylvania legislature in an effort to extend the statutory of limitations
period in Pennyslvania. See id. Rozzi himself was unable to pursue any legal action against
his alleged abuser because by the time he was ready to talk publicly about the incident
twenty-five years and the statute of limitations period had passed. See id.
154. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 302–07 (proposing that civil accountability of
negligent actors and abusers involved in civil sexual assault cases should be preserved by courts
and legislatures to promote the deterrence of behavior that subjects children to safety risks).
155. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (discussing the role
of legislative policy and changes to that policy when enacting retroactive extensions to the
statute of limitations).
156. See id. at 315–16 (acknowledging that legislatures enact policies that are
disadvantageous to some parties yet finding that this disadvantage is not an infringement on the
federal constitutional right to be immune from suit).
157. Cf. Marci A. Hamilton, Summary of Statutes of Limitations Reform Across the
United States (May 3, 2016), CARDOZO LAW, http://solreform.com/snapshot.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V5F-8PMM] (last visited Mar. 20, 2018) (noting legislatures that amended
statutes of limitations for CSA cases).
158. See Gallewski v. H. Hentz & Co., 93 N.E.2d 620, 624 (N.Y. 1950) (emphasizing
the importance of exceptional circumstances in evaluating the constitutionality of revival
actions); see also Soc’y Ins. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 786 N.W.2d 385, 401–02
(Wis. 2010) (considering the public interest served by the infringement on a defendant’s vested
property right using rational basis review).
159. See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 624 (analyzing the constitutionality of revival actions
using the exceptional circumstance standard rather than the per se determination); see also Soc’y
Ins., 786 N.W.2d at 396 & 396 n.12 (analyzing the constitutionality of revival actions using the
rational basis test rather than the per se determination).
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defendant’s right to plead a statute of limitations defense.160 However, the current
law in far too many states fail to incorporate these important factors and allow
their state constitutions to serve as a shield from holding institutions accountable
for CSA.161
V. CONCLUSION: TIME FLIES (WHEN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
ALLOW TIME TO FLY)
Because of the nature of CSA claims against third-party institutions and the
prolonged period it typically takes until the abuse is reported, CSA should not be
considered a typical antiquated claim that may have lost its relevancy and ability
to be properly addressed by a court over time.162 The trauma, devastation, and
ongoing predatory nature of these actions make this a timeless issue for victims,
advocates, and those institutions that are hoping to right their wrongs.163 State
constitutions should be interpreted to establish a structure that protects the
children of our country, not act as the strongest shield from accountability and
liability for those who contributed to their sexual victimization.164
Permitting retroactive legislation under the constitution of a given state is
crucial to provide CSA victims a platform to hold wrongdoers accountable.165
160. See Gallewski, 93 N.E.2d at 624–25 (discussing factors such as the legislative
interest in tort causes of action generally, a defendant’s interest in statute of limitations defense,
circumstances surrounding causes of actions, and “elementary notions of justice and fairness”);
see also Soc’y Ins., 786 N.W.2d at 397–98 (considering factors such as public interest, private
interest, reliance on previously settled laws, and the right to recover damages in the context of
pressing economic or social issues).
161. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 510–11 (Conn.
2015) (“[T]wenty-four states support the position that legislation that retroactively amends a
statute of limitations in a way that revives time barred claims is per se invalid.”).
162. See Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1994)
(discussing the primary purpose of the statute of limitations in providing a defendant the “right
to be free of stale claims”). In Order of Railroad Telegraphers, the Court noted that, although
the delayed time period between the event triggering the cause of action and the actual claim
filing was notably long and “regrettable,” the exigent circumstances causing the delay are
relevant to statute of limitation time-bars. See id. at 349 (finding the long delay in bringing the
suit was “caused by the exigencies of the contest, not by the neglect to proceed”). Such an
exigent circumstance is embodied in the unique nature of the lasting impacts on CSA victims.
See Alexandra Hunstein Roffman, The Evolution and Unintended Consequences of Legal
Responses to Childhood Sexual Abuse: Seeking Justice and Prevention, 34 CHILD. LEGAL RTS.
J. 301, 305 (2014) (“The secretive nature of child sex abuse and the propensity of children to
hold onto that secret for years at a time create unique circumstances.”).
163. See Ferrante, supra note 16, at 200–01 (“[C]hildren subjected to repeated acts of
sexual abuse suffer physically, psychologically and emotionally, often repressing the episodes
of sexual abuse in order to avoid dealing with the pain and trauma caused by the abuse.”); see
also JEROME KROLL, PTSD/BORDERLINES IN THERAPY: FINDING THE BALANCE 54 (1993)
(“[V]iolent, prolonged, or intrusive abuse . . . represents stressors that are beyond the adaptive
capacities of all but the most exceptional children and that will regularly produces a long-lasting
traumatic syndrome.”); Roffman, supra note 162, at 305 (identifying a victim’s own shame and
embarrassment about their abuse as a primary reason a child does not come forward at or near
the time they are abused).
164. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“[W]hen asking the civil responsibility question
in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should retain the accountability of third
parties.”).
165. See Hamilton, supra note 10, at 433 (“[Statute of limitations] reform does far more
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Institutions that supervise sexual predators will be deterred from continuing
practices that may have contributed to a child’s abuse if legislatures are
constitutionally authorized to revive time-barred claims.166 Similarly, the
possibility of civil liability will encourage these institutions to genuinely reform
their organizations to prevent future instances of abuse, creating a safer
environment for our nation’s youth.167
State constitutions should not shield wrongdoers when it comes to actions as
heinous as CSA.168 Retroactive revival of time-barred claims provides an
incentive for offending institutions to clean up their organization at the risk of
facing liability for actions that may have occurred long ago but still have lasting
impacts.169 In these instances, deterrence not only comes in the form of being
publicly held accountable, but also in the form of monetary damages that a court
may award to a plaintiff who was sexually victimized as a young child.170
The Supreme Court of the United States has established a constitutional
approach to retroactive extensions of statutes of limitation that would allow state
legislatures to deter and prevent child sexual abuse through state constitutions.171
than create justice for victims in the past. It also forestalls future abuse of today’s children. It
gives victims their day in court and levels the playing field between individual and institutional
entities that cause abuse and the victims.”).
166. See Miller, supra note 17, at 600–01 (noting how retroactive statutes of limitations
would allow victims “to obtain some form of retribution against the abusers” (citation omitted));
see also Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“Courts and legislatures can do something to protect
children from abuse by retaining institutional accountability and not permitting that
responsibility to be shifted back to criminals . . . or to vulnerable children who suffered
abuse.”); Wilson, supra note 53, at 518 (identifying legislative intent supporting some sexual
abuse laws as deterrent to potential offenders and discouragement of previous offenders from
repeating illegal actions).
167. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310 (“[W]hen asking the civil responsibility question
in a way that seeks to prevent child sexual abuse, courts should retain the accountability of third
parties.”).
168. See Garry, supra note 57, at 7 (discussing how state constitutions “set up the basic
organization of government, outline various government duties, and specify and protect
individual rights”). “With their unique histories and varied cultural backgrounds, state
constitutions often provide broader protections for individual rights than does the more
process-oriented U.S. Constitution.” See id. As both a survivor of CSA and a state legislator,
Pennsylvania Representative Mark Rozzi commented on his personal experience with the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations saying, “When I was [thirteen] years old and I was standing
in the shower getting raped with my best friend outside the door, do you think I knew what a
statute of limitations was?” See Malone, supra note 149.
169. See Bublick, supra note 16, at 310–11 (arguing that state law should apportion
liability to institutions to hold them accountable); cf. Sloan et al., supra note 564, at 473–74
(explaining that a law must be sufficiently threatening to preclude an actor from undertaking
the prohibited behavior).
170. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How
Much, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1146–47 (1989) (noting the deterrent effect of punitive damages);
Richard S. Gruner, Beyond Fines: Innovative Corporate Sentences Under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 261, 322 (1993) (noting the deterrent effect of negative
publicity). But see Sloan et al., supra note 54, at 498 (noting deterrent effects stemming from
tort liability has not been researched extensively but arguing “the theoretical analyses of tort as
a deterrent are quite optimistic about its effects”).
171. See Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 509 (Conn.
2015) (finding the federal approach to revival of time-barred actions “allow[s] the retroactive
expansion of the statute of limitations to revive otherwise time-lapsed claims—seemingly
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It is important to understand that legislative policy and constitutional
interpretation are not the cure-alls for the issues of pedophilia or organizational
corruption underlying institutional sex abuse.172 However, the public relation and
economic implications attached to these legal measures present an opportunity to
create an environment where children do not have to fear the very same people
that were meant to protect them.

without limitation” (emphasis added)).
172. See, e.g., Andrea Friedman, Pedophilia: Laws Fighting Nature Instead of Coping
with it, 43 SW. L. REV. 253, 268 (2013) (arguing the reform of laws related to pedophilia should
consider the complex scientific background of pedophilia that “is a biological condition
developed before birth”).
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